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Government and Business Cycles 
Irregular fluctuations in economic activity, as measured by aggregate 
production  and  employment,  are  a  persistent  characteristic of  market 
economies. What is the relation between these business cycles and the 
government’s monetary  and fiscal policies, by which we  mean its regu- 
lation  of  the  quantity  of  money  and  its  total  spending  and taxation? 
From an historical perspective, have governmental monetary  and fiscal 
actions  exacerbated  or  mitigated  business  cycles?  With  regard  to 
prospects  for  the  future,  what  are  the  possibilities  for  prescribing 
monetary and fiscal policies that can improve the cyclical performance 
of  the economy? 
A decade or so ago, the belief  was widespread that economists knew 
the answers to questions such as these, or at least knew how to find the 
answers.  This  belief  is  now  severely  shaken.  The previous  optimism 
derived mainly  from the reasonably  satisfactory  completion of  the re- 
search  program  associated  with  the  Keynesian  revolution.  This  pro- 
gram involved the resolution  of  long-standing theoretical  and empirical 
This paper  provides  an  introduction  to  the  subject  of  the  conference  on  ra- 
tional  expectations  and  economic  policy  and  a  selective  summary.  In preparing 
this paper, my  intent  has been to identify  critical  theoretical  and empirical ques- 
tions,  to  review  the  state  of  knowledge  about  these  questions,  and  to  give  a 
balanced  view  of  the  main  issues of  contention. I have  not  attempted  to survey 
the  literature. The  selected  references  are not exhaustive  and  are  intended  only 
to supplement my summary of  difficult points. 
Stanley  Fischer, the  organizer  of  the  conference,  gave me  considerable  advice 
on  the preparation  of  this  paper.  Robert  King  and many other people  gave me 
helpful  comments  on  preliminary  drafts.  The National Science  Foundation  pro- 
vided  support for the  conference as well  as for my  research  relating to the sub- 
ject of  the conference. 
5 6  Herschel I. Grossman 
issues  concerned  with  the  role  of  various  factors,  including monetary 
and fiscal actions, in the determination  of  aggregate demand for  out- 
put  and  labor  services.  It seems  clear,  however,  that  this  work  has 
not resulted in mastery of  the business cycle. 
Two sets of  events have contributed to the loss of  confidence in the 
power and beneficence of  economic knowledge and expertise. First, the 
actual  ability of  models  of  the economy to predict  business  cycle de- 
velopments  has  failed  to  meet  the  expectations  of  the  builders  and 
users  of  these  models.  Second,  the  government  has  failed  grossly  to 
deliver on official assurances regarding its ability to mitigate the business 
cycle. The optimism prevalent in the mid-sixties, associated most vividly 
with the idea of  fine tuning the macroeconomy, has soured in the face 
of  recession and inflation in the seventies. 
These disappointing developments, in conjunction with basic innova- 
tions in  economic analysis, have prompted a fundamental reconsidera- 
tion of  accepted  ideas about the economic behavior  that is responsible 
for business cycles and have cast doubts on previously established ways 
of  viewing  the  effects of  government  behavior  on the  economy.  Spe- 
cifically, we  can  identify  three  distinct but  complementary changes in 
thinking  about  the  relation  between  government  and  business  cycles. 
These changes are (1) the development and general acceptance of  “the 
natural rate hypothesis,”  which relates cyclical fluctuations in aggregate 
employment  to inaccuracy  in  inflationary  expectations,  (2) the wide- 
spread questioning of  the ability of  the political process to produce good 
economic policies,  and  (3) the  fundamentally  innovative idea  of  “ra- 
tional expectations.” Before discussing at some length the meaning and 
significance of  rational expectations, it will be useful to consider briefly 
the other two developments. 
The Natural Rate Hypothesis 
Prior to the formulation of  the natural rate hypothesis, conventional 
wisdom about the relation between  inflation  and economic aggregates, 
such as output, employment, and unemployment accepted the hypothe- 
sis of  a stable Phillips curve. This hypothesis  associated lower levels of 
unemployment  with  higher  rates  of  inflation  and  implicitly  assumed 
the terms of  this supposed trade-off  to be independent of  both past and 
current  monetary  and  fiscal  actions.  Accordingly,  government  could 
use monetary and fiscal policies to keep output and employment as high 
as it desired if  it were willing to accept the given rate of  inflation asso- 
ciated with these chosen levels of  output and employment. 
The natural  rate hypothesis  contradicted  this  conventional  wisdom 
by asserting that a fixed relation exists, not between economic aggregates 
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between the actual rate of  inflation and expectations about the rate of 
inflation.  More  specifically,  the  natural  rate  hypothesis  asserts  that, 
given  the  microeconomic  structure  of  the  economy,  the behavior  of 
private  economic agents-businessmen,  workers,  and consumers-that 
is  based  on  correct  expectations  about  the  rate  of  inflation  generates 
unique levels of  aggregate output, employment, and unemployment, de- 
noted for obscure historical reasons as “natural” levels. Levels of  aggre- 
gate  output  and  employment  above,  equal to,  or below  their  natural 
levels  are  associated  with  rates  of  inflation  higher  than, equal to,  or 
less  than  inflation  rates  that  have  already  come  to  be  generally 
expected. 
The natural rate hypothesis  does not imply that monetary  and fiscal 
actions do not affect the level of  aggregate demand for output and labor 
service, nor does it deny that aggregate demand affects the actual levels 
of output and employment. It does, however, imply limitations on what 
government policy can accomplish. Many factors, including fiscal policy 
actions such as changes in income tax rates and unemployment benefits, 
can cause the natural levels to change over time. But the natural rate 
hypothesis  implies that monetary  and  fiscal policies  have to affect the 
difference  between  actual  and  expected inflation  rates  to make actual 
levels of  output and employment change relative to their natural levels. 
Moreover, if, as seems reasonable, the experience of  actual rates of  in- 
flation higher or lower than expected tends to increase or decrease infla- 
tionary  expectations, the natural levels of  output  and employment are 
the only levels consistent with a constant rate of  inflation. Levels of  out- 
put and employment above the natural level involve steady increases in 
both the expected and actual inflation rates, and, as the converse prop- 
osition, reductions in the  expected  and  actual inflation  rates require  a 
period of recession, with levels of  output and employment below their 
natural levels. Thus, the natural rate hypothesis implies that no tenable 
monetary or fiscal policy  can permanently  keep  output above and un- 
employment below their  natural levels. 
The natural rate hypothesis  and its  implications  are robust proposi- 
tions, for they can be derived under a variety of  assumptions about the 
determination  of  economic  aggregates.  Specifically, some models  that 
imply  the  natural  rate  hypothesis  assume  that market-clearing  condi- 
tions  are  satisfied-that  is,  actual  quantities  realize  all  perceived  or 
predicted gains from trade. These models relate differences between the 
actual and natural levels of  the aggregates to differences between actual 
inflation  and  expectations of  actual  inflation  (Phelps  1967, Friedman 
1968). An  alternative model of  output  and employment  that also im- 
plies  the  natural rate hypothesis  allows  that wage  or price  stickiness 
or both  can  cause markets  to fail to clear.  This model  relates differ- 
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ences  between  actual  inflation  and  expectations  of  what  the  rate of 
inflation would be if  markets were to clear  (Barro and Grossman 1976, 
chap. 5). These examples indicate that the natural rate hypothesis  and 
its implications do not depend on particular  assumptions about market 
clearing.  These assumptions become critical when we consider the idea 
of rational  expectations. 
The Limited Capability of  the Political Process 
Prior  to the current decade, discussions of  the government’s role in 
the economy typically accepted, at least implicitly, the notion of  achiev- 
ing “the public  interest.” To make this  notion  operational, economists 
commonly  portrayed  the political  process as operating  as would a ra- 
tional being facing a maximization problem that is well defined and has 
a consistent  solution.  But both  recent  and distant history  suggest that 
this view does not provide a good basis for understanding  the govern- 
ment’s monetary and fiscal policies. 
This  observation  does  not  imply  that government  behavior  is  un- 
predictable.  In  principle,  appropriate  positive  models  of  the  political 
process could  account for actual monetary and fiscal actions, including 
both  stochastic and  nonstochastic  components.  Yet  these models pre- 
sumably would not be based on the idea of  the government’s maximiz- 
ing an unambiguous objective function subject to realistic constraints. 
One consideration  that  would  be  important  in  a  realistic  model  of 
government behavior is the failure of  economists, despite their devoting 
considerable resources  to the task, to produce firm enough knowledge 
about the  structure of  the  economy to support  confident  adoption of 
any  specific “stabilization  policy.”  Other  relevant  considerations  con- 
cern  the  responsiveness  of  representative  democracy  to the  electorate 
and  the  specific possibility  of  duplicity  on the part of  politicians  and 
bureaucrats. 
The most basic problem, however, seems to be the inherent weakness 
of politics as a process for making economic decisions. Experience sug- 
gests that the political  process has limited  ability  to specify consistent 
goals,  establish  priorities,  and  choose  between  competing  objectives 
about economic matters,  especially when  these  decisions require  com- 
prehension  of  complex  technical  issues  and  constant  processing  of 
complex  information.  The difficulty  of  reaching  a  political  consensus 
about  complicated economic issues would  seem  to be  sufficient, even 
if  we  had reliable  models  of  the economy and all officials were public 
spirited, to preclude  the adoption  of  consistent objectives  and the ex- 
plicit  acknowledgment  of  relevant constraints,  both  of  which  are pre- 
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For example, while economists investigate the dynamic relation between 
unemployment  and  inflation  and  argue  specifically  about  whether  a 
tradeoff  between  unemployment  and inflation  is possible,  the political 
process  has  had  difficulty accepting even  that such  a  trade-off  might 
be necessary. 
Actual  government  behavior  seems  to alternate,  almost  mindlessly, 
between  giving priority  to reducing unemployment  and giving priority 
to reducing inflation. It is  noteworthy that the alleged independence of 
the Federal Reserve system has not avoided this situation. In the present 
context, the main implication of  a realistic view of  government behavior 
and the political process would seem to be that, even assuming that the 
derivation  of  optimal  feedback  control  rules  for monetary  and  fiscal 
policies,  using  economic models  and  mathematical  optimization tech- 
niques,  were technically feasible,  the practical  applicability  of  such an 
approach is  questionable. 
Rational Expectations, Neutrality, and Nonneutrality 
The idea of  rational expectations is distinct from, but complementary 
to, these other changes in thinking about the relation between  govern- 
ment behavior and business cycles. The natural rate hypothesis  associ- 
ates variations  in  economic  aggregates  relative  to their  natural  levels 
with  expectational errors involving differences between  actual and ex- 
pected  rates  of  inflation.  The idea  of  rational  expectations takes  this 
line  of  thought  one fundamental  step  further  by proposing  a  general 
theoretical approach to the study of  expectations. The resulting analysis 
suggests that monetary  and fiscal policies may not be  able to produce 
systematic expectational errors, and this implies that the ability of  the 
government  to improve  the  aggregate performance  of  the  economy is 
even more limited than we inferred either from the natural rate hypothe- 
sis or from a realistic view of  the political process. Specifically, the idea 
of  rational  expectations suggests that it may  not  be feasible to design 
monetary and fiscal policies that can actively stabilize aggregate output 
and employment relative to their natural levels. More generally, the idea 
of  rational expectations suggests a new set of  questions about the causes 
of  business cycles and their relation to government behavior. 
Models that incorporate rational expectations have three main compo- 
nents.  One component, which provides  a framework  for working  out 
the  implications  of  rational  expectations,  involves  assumptions  about 
the structure of  the economy. These assumptions specify the relevance 
of  expectations  and  perceptions  for  the  market  activities  of  private 
agents,  the  relation  between  the  perceptions  of  government  officials 
and  their  monetary  and fiscal  actions,  and  the interaction  of  the be- 
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variables-output,  employment,  and  unemployment-and  the  rate of 
inflation. 
Full development of  these structural assumptions is a large undertak- 
ing and would be necessary for a complete understanding  of  business 
cycles, but  only  a  couple  of  assumptions  are critical for deriving the 
implications of  the idea of  rational expectations. One of  these assump- 
tions  is  that  the  information  that  is  potentially  relevant  for  private 
agents includes both  knowledge of  the specification of  the structure  of 
the economy itself and knowledge of  the past and current data that this 
structure  identifies  as  consequential.  A  second  critical  assumption  is 
applicability of  the natural rate hypothesis. 
The second  important  component,  which  is  also  the  primary  dis- 
tinguishing feature of  rational  expectations models, is the general prin- 
ciple (we can call it “the rational expectations postulate”)  that private 
economic  agents gather  and use  information  efficiently. This postulate 
treats informational  activities the  same as any other  activity that  eco- 
nomic  man  undertakes.  In  this  context,  efficiency  means  that  the 
amount of  resources  private  agents  devote to gathering and using  in- 
formation is such that the marginal  alternative cost of  these resources 
equals the marginal benefit from the information. 
Acceptance of  both the natural rate  hypothesis  and the rational  ex- 
pectations postulate  leads directly to the idea that problems of  obtain- 
ing  and  utilizing  information  are critical  factors  in  the  generation of 
business  cycles. Thus, the third  component  of  these  models, the rele- 
vance  of  which follows  directly  from  the  other  components,  involves 
specification  of  the  availability  and usability  of  information.  The de- 
velopment of  this component has led to a research program that focuses 
on the relations between  various information  problems,  monetary  and 
fiscal policies,  and the nature  of  business  cycles. The carrying out of 
this program in the last few years has involved considerable ingenuity. 
A central theoretical result of  this effort has been the formulation of 
a  set  of  assumptions  about  information  sufficient for  the  apparently 
paradoxical  juxtaposition  of  the  two  propositions  about  government 
behavior and business cycles that have become associated with the idea 
of  rational  expectations.  One  proposition,  which  we  can  denote  the 
neutrality  hypothesis,  is  that  the time  pattern  of  differences  between 
actual  and natural  levels of  aggregate output  and  employment, which 
forms the main component of  business cycles, is independent of mone- 
tary and fiscal actions that involve systematic responses to business cycle 
developments  (Sargent  and  Wallace  1975,  1976). According  to  this 
proposition, systematic monetary  actions  affect only nominal variables, 
such as the level of  prices and the rate of  inflation. The other proposition, 
which we can denote the nonneutrality hypothesis, is that the pattern of 
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subset of monetary and fiscal actions (Lucas 1972, 1975b, 1977; Barro 
1976). 
The precise  nature  of  these propositions  should  be  clarified. First, 
the  neutrality  hypothesis  does  not  say  that  systematic  government 
behavior  in  general  cannot  affect aggregate  output  and  employment. 
Rather, the  hypothesis  is  that  systematic  government  behavior  affects 
economic aggregates only to the extent that it alters the microeconomic 
structure  of  the  economy  and  changes  the  natural  levels  of  these 
aggregates. For example, according to the neutrality  hypothesis,  if,  as 
economic  theory  suggests, these  natural levels  are largely  independent 
of  monetary  phenomena,  systematic  monetary  actions  can  have  little 
effect  on  the  actual  levels  of  these  aggregates.  A  corollary  of  this 
proposition  is that the  analytical exercise  of  calculating optimal feed- 
back control rules for monetary policy  is not efficacious (Sargent and 
Wallace 1975, 1976; Lucas 1976). 
Second, the neutrality  and nonneutrality hypotheses  are not  contra- 
dictory.  Specifically, the  neutrality  hypothesis  does  not  say  that his- 
torically monetary and fiscal policies have not been important, perhaps 
the most  important,  factors in  generating real  macroeconomic fluctua- 
tions. Rather, the neutrality hypothesis  implies only that the systematic 
part of  monetary actions  has not been consequential in this respect. A 
separate question is whether the neutrality and nonneutrality hypotheses 
are  consistent in  the  sense of  being  joint  implications  of  a  plausible 
model. 
Third, neither the neutrality hypothesis nor the nonneutrality hypothe- 
sis follows  directly  from the natural  rate hypothesis  and  the rational 
expectations postulate  alone.  The set  of  additional  assumptions  about 
information  is  crucial.  The  most  important  assumptions  in  this  set 
seem to be the following: 
First, private agents know enough about the structure of  the economy 
to foresee correctly on average the effects of  monetary and fiscal actions, 
if  they either perceive or predict these policies accurately. This assump- 
tion  means  that the  subjective  probabilities  that private  agents  attach 
to  the  possible  effects of  perceived  or predicted  monetary  and  fiscal 
actions are equal to the true probabilities associated with these effects. 
Second, private  agents  readily  adjust their  behavior  in  accord  with 
these  perceptions  or expectations.  This  assumption means  that  actual 
quantities realize all perceived  or predicted gains from trade. In other 
words, aggregate output and employment satisfy market-clearing condi- 
tions,  a  situation  that,  as  mentioned  above,  some derivations  of  the 
natural rate hypothesis  already subsume. 
These first two assumptions imply that private behavior involving in- 
correct expectations about the rate of  inflation cannot result from cor- 
rectly  perceivable  or predictable  monetary  and  fiscal  actions.  Given 12  Herschel I. Grossman 
the natural rate  hypothesis,  this implication  means that perceivable  or 
predictable  monetary  and  fiscal  actions  on  average  do not  affect the 
time pattern of  differences between  actual and natural levels of  output 
and employment. 
Third,  if  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  involve  systematic responses 
to  business  cycle  developments,  which  would  include  the  case  of  a 
feedback control  rule,  even  if  the  government does  not  announce its 
behavioral  pattern,  private  agents  will  figure it out.  This  assumption 
means that systematic  monetary  and fiscal actions  are accurately pre- 
dictable,  and  this,  together  with  the  prior  two  assumptions  and  the 
natural rate hypothesis,  implies the neutrality hypothesis. 
Fourth, many  monetary  and  fiscal  actions  are neither  readily  pre- 
dictable, that is, systematic, nor readily perceivable. These actions gen- 
erate  private  behavior  that  is  based  on  incomplete  information  and 
possibly incorrect expectations about the rate of  inflation. For example, 
an unperceived monetary contraction can cause private agents to reduce 
employment  and  output  because  they  perceive  decreased  demand  for 
productive services that they supply to be  at least in part symptomatic 
of  a worsening of  the real terms  at which they can indirectly  exchange 
their  services for  goods  that  they  consume,  rather  than  to be merely 
symptomatic of  a general deflation in the nominal  values of  the goods 
they  buy  as  well  as  the  services  they  sell.  This  assumption  about 
incomplete information generates the nonneutrality hypothesis and per- 
mits the model that implies the neutrality hypothesis to allow as well for 
the apparent empirical relation between monetary and fiscal actions and 
business cycles. 
A fifth  assumption, which  extends the theory  beyond  the neutrality 
and  nonneutrality  hypotheses, is  that  the  degree  of  inaccuracy in  be- 
liefs about the  state of  the  economy  that results  from  a given  unpre- 
dictable and unperceivable monetary or fiscal action depends inversely 
on the magnitude and frequency of  such actions, that is, on the variance 
of monetary or fiscal policies. This assumption, like the first and third 
assumptions,  is  essentially  a  reflection  of  a  more  general  and  basic 
assumption  that  private  agents  who  behave  according to the  rational 
expectations postulate do not  make systematic mistakes. 
This fifth  assumption implies the proposition, which we  can denote 
as  the  variance  hypothesis,  that  the larger  the variance  of  monetary 
and fiscal behavior, the smaller the effects of  given unpredictable  and 
unperceivable  monetary  and  fiscal  actions  on  aggregate  output  and 
employment  (Lucas 1973, Barro 1976). The variance hypothesis repre- 
sents  an  elaboration  of  the  nonneutrality  hypothesis.  A  corollary  of 
the variance hypothesis is  the proposition, which we can denote as the 
misallocation  hypothesis,  that the larger the variance of  monetary  and 
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economic disturbances and to fail to make the adjustments in resource 
allocation that these other disturbances would otherwise call for  (Barro 
1976). 
Are  the Neutrality and Nonneutrality Hypotheses Consistent? 
Critical evaluation of  this model that combines rational expectations 
and incomplete information has involved  both  considerable discussion 
of  the a priori plausibility  of  the assumptions of  the model and tenta- 
tive  attempts  at  direct  econometric  testing  of  its  implications.  On  a 
priori  grounds,  the  assumption  about  incomplete  information,  which 
says specifically that a significant part of  monetary and fiscal actions are 
neither systematic nor perceivable,  seems to me to be the most trouble- 
some. The problem is that, although it seems reasonable to suppose that 
much government action is not systematic, the identification of  specific 
and significant monetary  and fiscal  actions that are not perceivable is 
not  immediately  obvious.  After  all, both  published  data that measure 
values  of  monetary  and fiscal variables  and price indexes, which indi- 
cate the aggregate  state of  the  economy,  are readily  available.  Conse- 
quently,  this  assumption  about  incomplete  information  seems  to re- 
quire  that  either  the  noise  or  the  reporting  lag  involved  in  these 
measurements is  operationally significant. The one empirical study that 
directly  addresses  this  issue  suggests,  however,  that  imperfections in 
the  published  data  do not  play  a  significant role  in  determining  the 
behavior of  economic aggregates  (Barro and Hercowitz 1978). 
Such results, if  supported by further empirical research, would make 
it hard  to accept  the juxtaposition  of the neutrality  and nonneutrality 
hypotheses. Specifically, without  this  assumption  about  incomplete in- 
formation, the other assumptions listed above would imply the neutral- 
ity hypothesis but would not imply the nonneutrality hypothesis. In this 
case, acceptance of  the proposition  that systematic monetary and fiscal 
policies cannot affect the course of  business cycles would  seem to im- 
ply  that  no  monetary  and  fiscal  actions  affect  business  cycles.  This 
implication  is  not  only  implausible  but  would  leave  us  without  a 
convincing theory  of why  economic aggregates  fluctuate at all. Alter- 
natively,  preservation  of  the  nonneutrality  hypothesis  would  require 
rejection  of  other  assumptions,  which  seem  to be  necessary  for the 
neutrality hypothesis. 
Pursuing this line of  thought, what can we  say about the plausibility 
and  significance  of  the  other  assumptions?  As  suggested  above,  the 
assumptions that concern knowledge about the structure of  the economy 
and the systematic behavior of  government  seem in spirit to be simple 
extensions  of  the  rational  expectations postulate,  which  in  turn  is  an 
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to  reject  these  assumptions  without  rejecting  the  presuppositions  of 
neoclassical  economic theory  (Lucas  1975a, McCallum  1979). 
A more contentious aspect of the derivation of  the neutrality hypothe- 
sis is the assumption, which concerns the utilization of  information, that 
aggregate  output  and  employment  satisfy  market-clearing  conditions. 
Of  particular  interest  in  this  context  are  recent  variations  on  the  SO- 
called  non-market-clearing  approach, which is  both  the primary para- 
digmatic rationalization for Keynesian models of  business cycles and the 
principal alternative to the incomplete information approach to explain- 
ing  the causal  relation  between  monetary  and  fiscal  actions  and  eco- 
nomic aggregates. The traditional  attraction of  the non-market-clearing 
approach has been that it explicitly takes into account alleged evidence 
of  the  chronic failure  of  markets  to clear,  such  as layoffs and  other 
apparent symptoms of  nonwage rationing of  employment. 
Recent  non-market-clearing  models  incorporate  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis,  the  rational  expectations  postulate,  and  the  assumptions 
that  private  agents understand  the  structure  of  the  economy  and the 
systematic behavior of  government; however, these models also assume 
that long-term contracts fix wages or prices  and prevent the realization 
of  advantageous transactions  that were  unpredictable  when  these con- 
tracts were being made but are perceived or become predictable during 
the term of  the contracts (Fischer 1977, Phelps and Taylor 1977, Taylor 
1979).  This  non-market-clearing  assumption  implies  that  monetary 
and  fiscal  actions  that  are  perceivable,  though  not  predictable  suffi- 
ciently  in  advance,  can  affect  the  course  of  business  cycles.  In these 
models assumptions about incomplete information are redundant. More- 
over, an additional assumption that the government can react to business 
cycle developments  faster than private  agents revise their contractually 
fixed wages and prices  implies  that  the neutrality  hypothesis  does not 
hold and that systematic monetary and fiscal policies are efficacious. 
Although  these non-market-clearing  models  are superficially appeal- 
ing, they are  also problematic.  For one thing, the argument that con- 
tractual rigidity is real is  not conclusive. Recent theoretical work based 
on  the  idea  that  labor  market  transactions  involve  arrangements  for 
shifting  risk  from  workers  to  employers  suggests  that  the  allegation 
that  actual  markets  chronically fail  to clear  may  reflect  an incorrect 
interpretation of  the facts. These risk-shifting models provide a rationale 
for observed stickiness of  wage rates  and explain alleged symptoms of 
employment  rationing, such as layoffs, while allowing markets to clear 
and private agents to realize  all perceived gains from trade (Grossman 
1979). 
Non-market-clearing  models  are  also  subject  to the  basic  a  priori 
objection  that  contractual  arrangements  restricting perceived  and mu- 
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markets  unless  there  were  costs  involved  in taking  advantage  of  in- 
formation  about  potential  gains  from  trade  (Barro  1977b). But  the 
existing literature has  not  identified any  convincing costs of  this type. 
Thus, these models of  contractual rigidity do not explain the failure of 
markets to clear. 
Another problem with the incomplete-information model that implies 
both the neutrality  and nonneutrality  hypotheses  is sometimes alleged: 
even if  some monetary  and fiscal actions are not currently perceivable, 
it  is  not  plausible  that  such  misperceptions  would  persist  over  time. 
This argument leads to the claim that this model is not consistent with 
observed  persistence  in  the effects  of  monetary  and  fiscal actions  on 
aggregate  output  and  employment.  Various  extensions  of  the  model 
show, however, that  an absence of  serial correlation in misperceptions 
does not preclude serial correlation in the effects of  these misperceptions 
resulting from gradual  adjustment  in, for example,  demands  for labor 
services,  inventories,  or physical  capital  (Blinder  and  Fischer  1978, 
Lucas and Sargent 1978, McCallum  1979  1. In addition, careful empiri- 
cal  analysis  suggests  that  the  amount  of  persistence  in  employment 
and unemployment  is much  less than  one might infer from casual in- 
spection of  the data (King 1978). 
Formal  econometric  analysis  of  models  incorporating  rational  ex- 
pectations  has involved  experimentation  with  a variety  of  approaches. 
One  interesting  example  is  the  development  of  operational  statistical 
distinctions between predictable  and unpredictable changes in the stock 
of  money  (Barro 1977a, 1978), and another is the testing of  the vari- 
ance  hypotheses  as  applied  to  monetary  disturbances  (Lucas  1973, 
Hanson  1978), but  none  of  the  econometric studies  have  yielded  a 
clear-cut  test  of  the  key  neutrality  hypothesis  (Lucas  1977b, Barro 
and Hercowitz  1978, McCallum  1979). Moreover, some of  the results 
of  such studies seem to be weak in the face of  small changes of  specifi- 
cation (Small 1979). 
In sum, the present state of the theory of  the business cycle and the 
role of  monetary  and fiscal policy is unsatisfactory.  The research  pro- 
gram  associated  with  the natural  rate hypothesis  and  the rational  ex- 
pectations postulate has raised basic questions but so far has provided 
fewer  answers.  The ingenious  incomplete  information model  that  im- 
plies  both  the  neutrality  and  nonneutrality  hypotheses  is  not  wholly 
convincing, but  a sound basis for preferring  any other  existing model 
of  the business cycle is still wanting. 
Significance of  Rational Expectations 
The  neutrality  hypothesis  implies  that  attempts  to  design  optimal 
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that  such  policies  affect  the  natural  level  of  output.  Whether  or not 
we  accept this hypothesis  and its radical implication, however,  the ra- 
tional  expectations  postulate  has had  profound  effects on our way of 
thinking  about  government  behavior.  For  example,  within  the  recent 
vintage of non-market-clearing models, analysis of  the determination of 
the  degree of  contractual  rigidity  as  a  balancing  of  adjustment  costs 
and benefits would seem to imply a version of  the variance hypothesis. 
Specifically, the  larger  the effort government makes  to use  systematic 
monetary and fiscal policies to manage economic aggregates, the larger 
the incentive private agents have to modify the form of  their contracts 
to mitigate these effects (Gray 1978). Thus, even in a model in which 
the neutrality hypothesis  does not hold, acceptance of  the rational  ex- 
pectations  postulate  implies  limitations  on  the  potential  effects  of 
systematic  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  on aggregate  output,  employ- 
ment, and unemployment. 
The importance of  the positive analysis associated  with  rational  ex- 
pectations, moreover, does not depend on whether or not actual mone- 
tary  behavior  results  as  if  from  the  solution  of  a  postulated  social 
optimization  problem.  The discussion  of  the  limited  capability of  the 
political  process  suggests  that  the  conventional  conception  of  basing 
monetary and fiscal policy on a maximization calculus is largely irrele- 
vant  and  that  adoption  of  a  consistent  stabilization  policy  is  not  a 
practical  possibility.  Thus,  the  implications  of  rational  expectations 
regarding  the potential  effects of  stabilization policy  and the feasibility 
of  the  optimal  control  approach  may  have  little  practical  relevance. 
Nonetheless,  the hypotheses associated  with  rational  expectations have 
essential  implications  for  understanding  the  effects  of  government be- 
havior, however it is generated. 
These  hypotheses,  in  addition,  do  not  imply  that  government  be- 
havior-or,  more  basically,  the  institutional  framework  within  which 
government behavior  is determined-is  without  normative significance, 
although  discussion of  the  normative  implications  of  these hypotheses 
requires  the  additional  specification  of  a  relevant normative  standard. 
For example, acceptance of  the neutrality hypothesis and the misalloca- 
tion  hypothesis  suggests  as  a  standard  of  optimality  the  hypothetical 
outcome  that  the  behavior  of  economic  agents  would  generate  in  a 
world  of  complete  information.  This  standard  implies  that  the  best 
policy the government can  pursue is dissemination of  any information 
it has and minimization of  the nonsystematic aspects of  its own behavior 
(Barro  1976). In  this  context,  particular  instances  of  nonsystematic 
government  behavior  on  average  do not  improve the  performance  of 
the economy, but the possibility of  such disturbances tends to mislead 
private agents about the nature of  other economic disturbances, thereby 
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The idea of  rational expectations also has profound implications for 
research  strategy, which reflects our way  of  looking at the behavior  of 
private economic agents and its relation to government behavior. Most 
basically, it  no longer  seems reasonable to analyze the effects of  gov- 
ernment behavior without  taking into  account  the reactions  of  private 
agents  behaving  in  accord  with  the  rational  expectations  postulate. 
Acceptance  of  this view implies, among other  things, rejection  of  the 
methodology  underlying  conventional  economic  forecasting  models 
(Lucas  1976). One might speculate that  the fact that  the idea of  ra- 
tional expectations threatens to make obsolete a substantial amount of 
professional capital, which is associated with forecasting models as well 
as  with  the  methodology  of  optimal  control,  helps  to  explain  the 
amount of  heated professional  controversy it has provoked. 
A final question is whether the implications  of  rational expectations 
are good news  or bad  news for the man  in  the street.  The neutrality 
hypothesis  is  surely  disturbing  to  those  who  view  government  as  an 
economic  doctor  attempting  to  use  stabilization  policy  to  treat  a 
periodically ailing private economy. In this view, past failure to mitigate 
the business cycIe has  resulted  from bad  luck or potentially  avoidable 
mistakes. 
An  alternative view, however, is that monetary  and fiscal policy has 
a sorry historical record that is the inevitable consequence of  the politi- 
cal  process  by  which  policy  is  formulated.  For  those  who  hold  this 
pathogenic view, the implications of  rational expectations are both good 
and bad.  On  the one hand, the variance hypothesis  implies basic limi- 
tations  on  the  potential  for  systematically  misguided  government  be- 
havior  to do harm to the economy. On the other hand, the misalloca- 
tion  hypothesis  implies  that  chronic  unpredictability  of  government 
behavior worsens the average performance of  the economy. From this 
point of  view, the basic structural reform  suggested by the idea of  ra- 
tional  expectations  is  the  adoption  of  stable  and  readily  predictable 
monetary  and  fiscal behavior. 
Summary of  Conference 
The papers and discussions of  the NBER conference touch  on most 
of  the issues raised in the preceding sections.  The paper by Robert J. 
Barro and Mark Rush, “Unanticipated Money and Economic Activity,” 
reports extensions of  Barro’s earlier econometric analysis that focuses on 
the  distinction  between  predictable  and  unpredictable  growth  in  the 
stock of money. The main innovations in  the conference paper involve 
refining the calculations of  predictable  and unpredictable money growth 
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aggregates  and  testing  of  these  cross-equation  restrictions.  Barro and 
Rush conclude that the new  evidence, both  annual and quarterly, pro- 
vides further support for the finding that aggregate  output  and unem- 
ployment respond to unpredictable money growth, but not to predictable 
money growth. They are less successful, however, in explaining changes 
in  the  price  level.  For  example, the  pattern  of  response of  the  price 
level  to  unpredictable  money  growth  does  not  seem  consistent  with 
the pattern of  response of  aggregate output. Barro and Rush stress that 
this  inconsistency  is  discomforting for  non-market-clearing  models  as 
well as for incomplete information models. Another problem is the lack 
of  close correspondence between  the pattern of  price response for an- 
nual data and that for quarterly data. These difficulties reaffirm the need 
for  further  development  of  the  theoretical  framework  underlying  the 
empirical  analysis, 
In his discussion of  the paper by Barro and Rush, Robert Weintraub 
questions whether the assumption that monetary policy reacts to unem- 
ployment implicit in Barro and Rush’s calculations of  predictable money 
growth  is  consistent  with  the  neutrality  hypothesis.  Weintraub  also 
expresses doubt that the data would contradict other assumptions about 
monetary policy. 
Robert  J.  Gordon’s  discussion  of  the  paper  by  Barro  and  Rush 
stresses the difficulty of  reconciling  the estimated  response pattern for 
prices with the incomplete information model.  Moreover,  Gordon em- 
phasizes the apparent reality of  the non-market-clearing assumption and 
the apparent falsity of  the incomplete information assumption. 
The paper by  Robert  J. Shiller, “Can the Fed Control Real Interest 
Rates?”  sets  up  a model  embodying assumptions  that imply  both  the 
neutrality and nonneutrality hypotheses and shows that these hypotheses 
also extend  to the rationally expected  real interest rate, defined as the 
difference between the nominal interest rate and the rationally expected 
rate of  inflation. Although  prima facie evidence suggests that monetary 
actions  can  affect  the  rationally  expected  real  interest  rate,  Shiller’s 
analysis  implies  that  such evidence  does not  contradict  the neutrality 
hypothesis and does not mean that systematic monetary policy can con- 
trol the time pattern of  this interest rate. Shiller discusses various ob- 
servations that  bear on the plausibility of  the neutrality hypothesis  and 
stresses  doubt  about  the  crucial  market-clearing  assumption.  Shiller’s 
main point, however,  is that existing data on seasonal or cyclical time 
patterns of  realized real interest rates do not provide a logical basis for 
an empirical test of  the neutrality hypothesis. 
The paper  by  Olivier  Jean Blanchard,  “The  Monetary  Mechanism 
in the Light of  Rational Expectations,” presents a non-market-clearing 
model  of  the  recent  vintage  that  incorporates  the  idea  of  rational 
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termines  aggregate output,  with  output  prices  either rigid or adjusting 
gradually in response to non-market-clearing  situations, but that expec- 
tations of  future wage income, which  affect consumption  demand, and 
expectations of  eventual market-clearing prices, which serve as a target 
for actual price  adjustment, are accurate. Blanchard  simulates  the ef- 
fects of  monetary  disturbances  on aggregate output, asset  prices,  and 
output prices, using some parameter estimates reported in another paper 
and some made-up parameters. The simulations draw the important dis- 
tinction  between  anticipated  and unanticipated  disturbances,  and they 
suggest in general that assumptions about expectations are quantitatively 
important for dynamic adjustments in this type of  model. 
Bennett  McCallum’s  discussion  of  Blanchard’s  paper  presents  a 
critique  of  the  econometric  procedure  that  produces  parameter  esti- 
mates  used  in  the  simulations.  This  critique  brings  out the  inherent 
difficulty of  drawing confident quantitative conclusions about the struc- 
tural relations of  the macroeconomy, especially when the model of  the 
economy takes expectations  and their formation carefully into account. 
Michael  Parkin’s  discussion stresses the basic  objection  that  the non- 
market-clearing assumption, which, in Blanchard’s model, allows mone- 
tary disturbances to affect aggregate output, lacks a firm basis. 
Stanley  Fischer,  in  his  paper  “On  Activist  Monetary  Policy  with 
Rational  Expectations,”  argues  that  the  type  of  model  specified by 
Blanchard is realistic. Specifically, Fischer  asserts that various  costs of 
utilizing information  provide  a  plausible  a  priori  basis  for the non- 
market-cIearing  assumption.  Fischer  also explains  that  Barro’s  econo- 
metric analysis, which suggests that predictable monetary actions do not 
affect aggregate output, is consistent with the idea of  rational  expecta- 
tions but does not provide a test of  the neutrality hypothesis. In particu- 
lar,  Barro’s  evidence  does  not  imply  that  systematic  monetary policy 
cannot affect the course of  business cycles by reacting to new informa- 
tion  faster than  private  agents. Fischer stresses that, if  we  accept the 
non-market-clearing  assumption  and the implied potential for effective 
systematic monetary  policy, the key issue becomes whether the policy- 
making process  is capable of  taking  good  advantage of  this potential. 
Fischer  discusses  various  economic  and  political  considerations  that 
seem relevant to this issue and reaches cautiously optimistic conclusions. 
Mark Willes’s discussion of  this paper  stresses the point that the idea 
of  rational expectations at the least has shaken confidence in the ability 
of  economists  to  design  effective  stabilization  policy  and  has  shifted 
the burden of  proof  to those who advocate activist policy. 
Finn Kydland  and Edward C. Prescott investigate the implications of 
rational  expectations for choosing among alternative fiscal policy rules 
in their paper “A Competitive Theory of Fluctuations and the Feasibility 
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a model in which the neutrality  and nonneutrality hypotheses both ob- 
tain, and their  analysis focuses on the effects of  changes in technology 
and shifts in  fiscal policies  on  aggregate  employment.  In their  model, 
these  effects  are persistent,  but  not  permanent.  Kydland  and Prescott 
conclude that tax rates should not respond either to fluctuations in eco- 
nomic aggregates or to temporary changes in public expenditures. Robert 
Hall’s discussions of  this paper  and of  Fischer’s paper  stress both the 
crucial role that the assumptions about market-clearing and non-market- 
clearing play  in  the  analysis  and the lack  of  a  convincing case either 
for accepting or for rejecting these assumptions. 
In the paper “Rules, Discretion, and the Role of  the Economic Ad- 
visor,”  Robert E. Lucas  argues that the  idea  of  rational  expectations 
provides a powerful tool for analyzing the consequences of  various fixed 
policy rules but also implies that economic analysis cannot hope to pre- 
dict the consequences of  discretionary policies. Lucas acknowledges that 
the rational expectations postulate by itself does not imply the neutrality 
hypothesis  and,  hence,  does  not  preclude  consideration  of  systematic 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
The paper by Robert M. Solow, “What to Do  (Macroeconomically) 
When  OPEC  Comes,”  discusses  what  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
should have been during 1974-75  on the basis of  a non-market-clearing 
model  that is  not  restricted  to  conformity  either  to  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis or to the rational expectations postulate. Solow characterizes 
actual policy during this period as “mindless.” 
The paper by William Poole, “Macroeconomic Policy,  197  1-75 : An 
Appraisal,” reviews the record of  monetary and fiscal actions and price 
controls during that period and concludes that these discretionary poli- 
cies  were  a  cause  of  substantial  fluctuations  in  economic  aggregates. 
Poole attributes  much  of  the  bad  record  of  macroeconomic policy to 
political  considerations that impinge on all policy  makers. He suggests 
that legislated policy rules would improve the performance  of  policy. 
A summary of  the conference also provides a summary of  the current 
state of  thinking about the issues relating to rational expectations. Four 
main observations seem warranted.  First, nearly  all of  the participants 
accepted  the rational  expectations postulate,  at  least  as a working  as- 
sumption. Second, most  of  the participants  expressed  a priori reserva- 
tions  about  both  the  incomplete  information  approach  and  the  non- 
market-clearing  approach to understanding business cycles. They agreed 
that there do not seem to be firm a priori grounds for either accepting 
or rejecting the neutrality hypothesis. Third, the participants agreed that 
at present  no solid  empirical evidence  exists relating to the  neutrality 
hypothesis, and they were not sure about how to produce such evidence. 
Fourth,  the  participants  expressed  the  prevailing  skepticism  about 21  Rational Expectations, Business Cycles, and Government Behavior 
activist stabilization policy. This attitude seemed to result in part from 
acceptance of  the idea of  rational expectations and in part from the dis- 
appointing record of  actual monetary and fiscal policies. 
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